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The Price Premium for Organic 
Babyfood: A Hedonic Analysis 
Kelly B. Maguire, Nicole Owens, and  Nathalie B. Simon 
The price premium associated with organic babyfood is estimated by applying a 
hedonic model to price and characteristic data for babyfood products collected in two 
cities: Raleigh, North Carolina, and San Jose, California. The price per ounce of baby- 
food is modeled as  a function of a number of babyfood and store characteristics. The 
estimated organic price premium is generally equal to 3e to 4e per ounce. To the 
extent this premium reflects consumer willingness to pay to reduce pesticide 
exposures, it could be used to infer values for reduced dietary exposures to pesticide 
residues for babies. 
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Introduction 
Understanding how parents value risk reductions for their children has become an 
important issue in policy analysis. The need for this information stems from advances 
in risk assessment which allow for age-specific analyses in some cases, as well as the 
issuance of Executive Order 13045  requiring all federal agencies to pay particular atten- 
tion to environmental health and safety risks to children (Federal Register, 1997). One 
way to gauge how parents value these risk reductions is to examine products available 
for purchase that reduce risks to children. Recent expansion of the organic babyfood 
market makes jarred babyfood an ideal candidate for such an analysis, as babyfood is 
purchased for a specific member of the family and requires little to no additional effort 
on the part of the parent to utilize. 
In recent years, the public has expressed concern for healthier eating in general, 
and safer foods in particular (Huang, Misra, and Ott, 1990;  Weaver, Evans, and Luloff, 
1992).  Organic foods, which are  generally perceived as  pesticide free and therefore safer 
than conventionally grown foods, are a way to introduce safer foods into a diet.'  In 
October 2002, new U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) guidelines went into effect 
requiring producers and handlers be certified by a USDA-accredited agent to sell, label, 
or represent their products as  organic (Federal  Register, 2000). However, even before the 
new guidelines were binding, a wide and growing variety of organic foods, both processed 
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and fresh, were availablewith  babyfood being one notable choice in the organic market. 
Industry sources cite a 20% increase in organic food sales between 1999 and 2000 
(Meyers and Rorie, 2000), and the USDA cites a rise in sales in the organic babyfood 
market as well (Harris, 1997).  Additionally, sales of  organic babyfood are expected to 
more than double between 2001 and 2006 (Fetto, 2003). These trends may signal a 
desire on the part of  parents to reduce certain pesticide-related health risks for their 
~hildren.~ 
Taking advantage of  the increased availability of  organic varieties and the unique 
properties of  jarred babyfood, the price premium paid for the organic component is 
estimated in this study using hedonic methods. This premium is calculated using retail 
price data in two U.S. cities, and then compared to the premium obtained in studies of 
other markets to gain insights into the relative value consumers  place on organic baby- 
food. A subject of  future research is to use this information to estimate values for reduced 
lifetime cancer risks to babies, a topic discussed briefly below. 
Previous Studies 
The organic market has been studied extensively, with several researchers estimating 
the price premiums for different organic products. Earlier studies have reported on 
consumer willingness  to pay for organic produce in hypothetical settings (e.g., Hammitt, 
1990; Fu, Liu, and Hammitt, 19991, and others have reported price differences based on 
actual market prices for organic produce (Estes  and Smith, 1996)  or other products, such 
as clothing made from organic cotton (Nimon and Beghin, 1999). These studies provide 
useful information regarding the organic market, and they confirm intuition that the 
organic price premium is positive. However, because of  the heterogeneity of  products, 
they provide little information on the magnitude of  the price differential one might 
expect to find in the babyfood market. 
Several studies have focused exclusively on the babyfood market. For example, 
Thompson and Glaser (2001)  analyzed two sets of scanner data from the late 1980s and 
the 1990s to investigate own- and cross-price elasticities for conventional and organic 
babyfood. Based on their findings, the own-price elasticity for organic babyfood is  large, 
suggesting small changes in prices could lead to large changes in consumption. 
Thompson and Glaser's analysis also shows a clear downward trend in the organic price 
premium for four types of babyfood. A 1997 hedonic study by Harris, also using scanner 
data from large grocery stores only, reports a premium associated with organic babyfood 
of  21~  per jar. 
While the above results are useful, both studies pre-date recent expansions in the 
babyfood market. Furthermore, because scanner data are only available for large grocery 
store chains, both studies necessarily exclude a portion of  the market. The data used 
here, in addition to being more recent, encompass all store types, not just the large 
grocery store chains, and allow any changes that may have occurred in the market to 
be captured. There are, however, disadvantages to these data. They depict a single 
'Ad~ertisingma~  have played a role in increasing  demand. For example,  an analysis by Mathios and Ippolito (1999)  found 
consumer diets improved after policy changes allowing manufacturers to link diet and disease went into effect. Babyfood 
manufacturers have not explicitly linked consumption of organic babyfood to reduced health risk on their labels, although 
the Earth's Best website does note their product is produced 'tvithout  potentially harmful pesticides and fertilizersn  (Earth's 
Best, 2002). 134  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
cross-section from two cities representing less than 1%  of the U.S. population of children 
less than one year of age. Furthermore, data on the quantity of babyfood purchases are 
not included. Nonetheless, this investigation complements analyses using scanner data 
by providing a more complete picture of retail venues in the babyfood market. In 
addition, the  hedonic method employed is  an  inexpensive and straightforward technique 
for estimating implicit prices. While the data do not allow for an  estimation of demand 
functions and welfare estimates resulting from policy changes, as do the scanner data, 
the  data do provide a unique perspective in that all establishments selling babyfood are 
represented. 
The Hedonic Model 
Babyfood is available in many brands and flavors, and is sold by developmental stage 
of the child in a variety ofvenues. h  such, it  is  difficult to determine the organic premium 
from observations of prices alone. For example, two jars of babyfood may differ across 
many dimensions, such as organic versus conventional, flavor, and brand. The hedonic 
framework allows the estimation of the price for the organic characteristic (or any char- 
acteristic), distinct from the other characteristics of babyf~od.~ 
Rosen (1974) contributed the seminal paper on the formal derivation of  the hedonic 
method. His model is briefly described to demonstrate how observations on babyfood 
prices can be used to infer the price of the organic characteristic, which represents both 
consumer and producer optimal behavior. 
Consumers purchase one unit of a differentiated good, y, which is a jar of  babyfood 
in this study. Babyfood consists of n component characteristics: y,, y,, ...,  y,.  These char- 
acteristics include the organic characteristic (i.e., organic or conventional), brand, and 
venues where sold. Consumers maximize utility, u, subject to a budget constraint, where 
utility is a function of a composite good, x, and the purchase of one unit of the differen- 
tiated good, y, which is a 11  x n)  vector of characteristics. That is, consumers maximize 
u(x, y) subject to a budget constraint, m = x +p(y),  where m is income andp(y)  is the 
price of babyfood. The price of the composite good, x, is normalized to one, and the mar- 
ket is assumed to be competitive so consumers take prices as given. The maximization 
problem yields first-order conditions as  follows: 
Utility is maximized when the marginal rate of substitution between a characteristic 
of babyfood, y,, and the composite good is equal to the marginal price of y,. Individuals 
will consume a component characteristic (as  revealed through their purchase of y)  to the 
point where the  relative value of that characteristic, or the  marginal willingness to pay, 
is equal to its marginal price. Specifically, for a given level of income, individuals will 
choose a jar of babyfood with a set of characteristics (e.g., Gerber, organic, multi-pack) 
and price which maximize their utility. 
3An  alternative model would be to estimate decisions over time in a discrete choice framework, as suggested by a reviewer. 
Presently, the data to conduct such an analysis for all establishments are not available. Maguire, Owens, and Simon  The Price Premium for  Organic Babyfood  135 
On the supply side of the market, producers maximize their profits, IT, by choosing an 
amount (T)  to produce of good y, babyfood, which consists of component characteristics, 
y,, ...,  y,.  Total revenues are equal to Q(y).  Again, markets are assumed to be competi- 
tive and firms take prices as given. Costs of  production are c(T, y; PI, where P is a 
parameter describingvariables in the  cost-minimization problem, such as  factor pri~es.~ 
Hence, the profit function is  IT = Tp(y) - c(T, y; PI. Firms maximize profits by choosing 
the amount of y to produce, such that the following condition holds: 
where dCldy, is the marginal cost of producing yi.5  In (21, the profit-maximizing level of 
production occurs where the per unit marginal cost of producing a characteristic,  yi, is 
equal to the marginal price of that component. 
From (1)  and (2),  the following relationship holds: 
The price of a component characteristic, yi,  represents both the  relative value consumers 
place on the characteristic, as well as the per unit marginal cost of production of the 
characteristic. In other words, the price of yi represents optimal behavior by both sides 
of the market. This relationship allows one to analyze the price premium for organic 
babyfood based on prices observed in  the market (i.e., posted prices), as  opposed to actual 
transactions. 
Rosen (1974) further specifies a bid function, O(yi; u, m),  and an offer curve, @(yi;  IT, 
p), showing the amount consumers are willing to pay and producers are  willing to pro- 
duce, respectively, of a particular yi,  for given levels of utility and income for consumers 
and profit and production costs for producers. The tangency between these two curves 
traces the hedonic price function relating the price of a good to its characteristics, 
p(y,, ..., y,).  In this way, data on prices and characteristics can be used to estimate the 
marginal value of one characteristic, holding all others constant. 
The relationship between prices and characteristics of babyfood is estimated as 
follows: 
where pj  is the price of the  jth jar of babyfood, Sj represents a vector of store character- 
istics for each jar, Fj  represents a vector of characteristics of  the babyfood other than 
organic for each  jar, and  Oj  denotes the  organic component of the  babyfood. This analysis 
is also referred to as a first-stage hedonic price function. The derivative of this function 
with respect to a component price represents a second-stage hedonic price function and 
can be used to estimate the demand for a component. Such estimation would require 
data on individual consumer characteristics, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
"ecause  no assumptions are made regarding returns to scale, T is an argument in the cost function. 
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The Structure of the Babyfood Market 
In the United States, there are five major brands of jarred babyfood available at  retail 
outlets: Beechnut, Gerber, Earth's Best, Heinz, and Organic Baby.6  Beechnut and Heinz 
offer conventional  babyfood only, Earth's Best and Organic Baby are  exclusively organic 
babyfood, while Gerber offers both conventional and organic varieties. In 2000, Gerber 
enjoyed a 70% market share, Beechnut had a 13%  market share, and Heinz had an 11% 
market share of  the total babyfood market (U.S. Business Reporter, 200l).~ 
Introduced in 1988  in Vermont, Earth's Best was, for many years, the only nationally 
available organic babyfood, and initially could be purchased only in health food stores. 
By 1996, Earth's Best was sold in approximately 45% of  supermarkets in the United 
States (Harris, 1997).  In the late 1990s, Gerber introduced Tender Harvest, an organic 
line of  babyfood. While initially produced only in limited varieties, Tender Harvest has 
recently expanded to offer more choices. Relatively little information is available on the 
origins of  the Organic Baby brand of  babyfood. Jarred babyfood is sold in major grocery 
stores in the United States, as  well as smaller convenience stores, drug stores, and other 
specialty markets. Both organic and conventional babyfood are  sold in most of the larger 
venues. 
Most parents purchase jarred babyfood for their child as a convenient method for 
introducing solid, table food. Jarred babyfood is offered by "stage" which is directly 
related to the developmental stage or age of the baby. Generally, there are three stages 
within each brand. Stage 1  babyfood consists of simple, single-flavor  foods, such as  peas 
or peaches, serving as a baby's first introduction to "solid" food. Stages 2 and 3 often 
combine flavors (e.g., blueberries and pears) and offer increasingly complex flavors by 
combining food groups (e.g., beef and pasta). As stage increases, so does the texture of 
the food. 
Within a stage, babyfood can be categorized according to seven types: cereal, fruit, veg- 
etable, fruit-vegetable combination,  meat, dinner, and dessert. Not all types are offered 
in each stage. The meat category consists of  jars with single ingredients (e.g., beef), 
whereas the dinner category consists of  more traditional dinner-like flavors (e.g., beef 
noodle dinner). There are a variety of  flavors available within each stage and type. For 
example, common stage 2 fruits include pears, plums with apples, and apple-blueberry. 
Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
Conventional and organic babyfood are sold in a number of  retail outlets in the United 
States. These outlets vary from large, regional grocery stores to small specialty shops 
and convenience stores. No one store in either of this study's sample cities was expected 
to be representative of all brands, types, and flavors of babyfood, so different types 
of venues were included in  the sample. Babyfood price and characteristic data were 
'  In 1996,  Heinz USA acquired Earth's Best. Since 1998,  under various agreements, Earth's Best products were sold to 
natural food stores and retail outlets by Hain Celestial Foods under a license from Heinz. In September 1999,  Hain Celestial 
Foods purchased the trademarks of Earth's Best from Heinz. Additionally, after the data used in this study were collected, 
a new brand of organic babyfood, Healthy Times, became available in some retail outlets. 
These percentages incorporate all babyfood products, including cereals and juices, and therefore do not represent the 
market shares for jarred foods exclusively. It  is likely the market shares forjarred foods differ only slightly since the smaller 
babyfood manufacturers offer fewer non-jarred choices. Therefore, the market shares for Gerber, Heinz, and Beechnut are 
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Table 1. Distribution of Venues for Jarred Babyfood Products by City 
Distribution by City (%) 
Venue Type  San Jose  Raleigh 
Grocery Stores  74  89 
Upscale Markets  4  1 
Ethnic Markets  7  da 
Discount Stores  3  6 
Small Grocery Stores  5  da 
Convenience Stores 
Other Stores  a 
Number of observations  759  930 
Date of data collection  August 20-21,2001  February 5-6,2001 
""Other Storesn  consist of venues such as Babies R' Us, which do not neatly fall into the  other categories. 
collected from 38 establishments in Raleigh, North Carolina, in February 2001, and from 
45 establishments in San Jose, California, in August 2001.~  Stores in each city were 
randomly selected from a list of  all retail food establishments generated from current 
local online consumer yellow pages.9 The samples were stratified across establishment 
types based on the distribution of  food purchased by location for consumers in the United 
States [USDALEconomic Research Service (ERS),  20001. Although specific information 
is not available on the distribution of jarred babyfood sales by location, the USDALERS 
data were used as a basis for the stratification, and the sample was reallocated to reflect 
likely babyfood retail venues. 
Table 1  summarizes the distribution of visited establishments in the two-city sample. 
Although Raleigh has more large grocery stores than San Jose, none of  the ethnic or 
small grocery stores in the Raleigh sample sold babyfood. Unlike previous analyses 
using scanner data (e.g., Harris, 1997; Thompson and Glaser, 2001), all venue types 
within each city were sampled, thus providing a more complete representation of  the 
market for babyfood. 
In each of  the stores in the sample, data were recorded on all jarred babyfood offered 
for sale. Because price varies only rarely across flavors within a stage and type, baby- 
food type (e.g., hit,  vegetables, dinner) within stage and brand was selected as the unit 
of  observation.1°  For example, Beechnut stage 1  hits  are an observation, as are Heinz 
stage 2 dinners. Specifically, information on the following characteristics was collected: 
the price of each observation, the number of flavors offered for sale, the shelf space allo- 
cated to the observation, and other relevant store characteristics. 
The decision to collect data from Raleigh and San Jose was based on several factors. The desire was to have two cities 
of similar sizes, but with variation in  characteristics in  order to achieve amore representative picture of the national market. 
The percentage of the population under one year of age is similar in  Raleigh and San Jose-1.4%  and 1.5%,  respectively. Yet, 
the composition of the entire population of  the two cities is quite different. For example, the population of  San Jose is 
approximately 30% Hispanic or Latino, while in Raleigh less than 10%  of the population is Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2003). No claims are made, however, that these results are applicable to the entire United States. 
'The  consumer yellow pages can be found online at  http://yp.yahoo.com. These pages were accessed on January 29,2001, 
and again on July 31,2001. 
10 When price did vary within an observation, a weighted average of the prices of  all flavors was calculated to derive an 
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Information on within-brand variations in product labeling that had potential for 
influencing price was also obtained. For example, Beechnut offers a "Simple Recipes" 
line, which has fewer additives than its regular line. Jarred babyfood is sometimes pro- 
vided in type-specific "multi-packs" (e.g., four jars of  stage 2 fruits packaged together); 
recognizing  that multi-packs  could be priced differently  than single  jars, multi-packs are 
considered separate observations,  noting the number of jars packaged together and the 
babyfood type and stage. Several detailed categories for the type of  grocery store were 
developed, including ethnic, small, and upscale grocery stores. 
As noted earlier, while babyfood is widely available in a myriad of  stores, no single 
store is representative of  all available brands, particularly with regard to the organic 
brands. In Raleigh, Earth's Best and Organic Baby were rarely available in the tradi- 
tional grocery stores, and some stores carried only Gerber brands. In San Jose, there 
was more variety in each store, but still Organic Baby was rarely available in the tradi- 
tional outlets. Hence, within each city, it was necessary to canvass a variety of  stores 
in order to obtain a representative sample of  babyfood available for sale. 
Data collection resulted in 1,689 usable observations, with 930 observations from 
Raleigh, and 759 observations from San Jose. Detailed descriptions  of relevant variables 
are provided in table 2; summary statistics are reported in table 3. The data consist of 
prices and organic designation, other product characteristics, and store characteristics, 
corresponding  to the categories in (4). Several variables describe the products in each 
category. For example, product characteristics consist of label, stage, and brand. 
Descriptive statistics are provided for the full data set, as  well as by store type within 
location. Grocery stores are large retail brand-name outlets, such as Safeway or Winn 
Dixie. These stores are more likely to be similar in size, layout, and familiarity to the 
consumer, as  compared to other store types. Approximately 21% of  the observations are 
organic; there are  more organic observations in San Jose grocery stores than in all other 
categories. In Raleigh, there are more organic observations in other store types than in 
grocery stores. Consequently, in Raleigh, organic babyfood is less likely to be a part of 
the mainstream market, as represented by the traditional grocery store venue. 
Estimation Results and  Discussion 
Turning to the empirical estimation, the theoretical foundation for the hedonic model 
provides little guidance on the functional form to use. Babyfood is assumed to be 
separable and additive in the various characteristics (stage, organic, type, and flavor), 
suggesting a linear relationship for estimation purposes. This implies babyfood charac- 
teristics can be unbundled, repackaged, and purchased in any combination. For example, 
one can purchase stage 1  organic peas or stage 1  conventional peas at different stores." 
Palmquist (1991, p. 79) states that when characteristics can vary independently of 
each other, the linear hedonic price function is appropriate. With some products this is 
an unreasonable assumption. For example, two two-bedroom homes are unlikely to be 
equivalent to one four-bedroom home. However, in this study, costless repackaging is 
in fact a reasonable assumption because most of  the characteristics are only available 
by purchasing an  additional unit. In order to purchase additional "unitsn  of organic, 
11 Thi  '  s is not strictly the case at  all  venues, but applies in general, and therefore the model is appropriate  for analysis. For 
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Table 2. Description of Variables 
Variable  Description 



























Price per ounce 
Price per ounce of conventional babyfood 
Price per ounce of organic babyfood 
= 1  if an organic product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a meat product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a special label within brand, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a stage 1  product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a stage 2 product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a stage 3 product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a Gerber product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  ifa  Beechnut product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if an Earth's Best product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if a Heinz product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if an Organic Baby product, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in a multi-pack, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in a grocery store, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in a specialty grocery store, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in an ethnic grocery store, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in a discount store (e.g., Target, K-Mart),  = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in a small neighborhood market, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in a convenience store, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if sold in other store type (e.g., drug store), = 0  otherwise 
Square feet of  shelf space devoted to observation 
= 1  if sold in Raleigh, NC, = 0  if sold in San Jose, CA 
individuals must purchase additional  jars, which in this framework are available to the 
consumer at a constant marginal price per unit during each shopping excursion.12 
Further justification for a linear model can be found in Feenstra (1995),  who argues 
if firms are able to exert price-setting behavior such that marginal prices are set above 
marginal costs, then a log-linear model will overstate the marginal value of  character- 
istics but a linear model will not. To the extent the babyfood market is dominated by one 
large producer, namely Gerber, price-setting  behavior is a possibility; however, we have 
no evidence to support or refute this contention. 
Based on (4), several variables are used to measure the store and babyfood character- 
istics; the organic characteristic is measured directly. Babyfood characteristics are 
measured using indicator variables for the following: meat products, special labels, 
stage, brand, and multi-packs. Store characteristics are measured by the type of  store, 
''Although  this framework implies the marginal price of the organic characteristic is constant, this is not necessarily prob- 
lematic. In the babyfood market, consumers are unlikely to experience  diminishing  marginal utility over the course of time 
jarred babyfood products are wed or over the total quantity of babyfood consumed. Furthermore, a constant marginal price 
is necessary under certain assumptions regarding health risk (e.g., threshold risks). 140  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Descriptive Sllmmary Statistics: Means / (Standard Deviations) 
Variable 
San  Jose  Raleigh 
All Data  Grocery  Other Stores  Grocery  Other Stores 
PRICES  AND  ORGANIC  VARIABLE: 
PRICE  0.15 
(0.14) 
PRICE-COW  0.14 
(0.04) 
[n  = 1,3411  " 
PRICE-ORG  0.18 
(0.03) 
[n  = 3481 
ORGANIC  0.21 
(0.40) 
PRODUCT  CHARACTERISTICS: 
MEAT  0.05 
(0.21) 
LABEL  0.22 
(0.41) 
STAGE 1  0.19 
(0.39) 
STAGE2  0.56 
(0.50) 
STAGE3  0.25 
(0.43) 
GERBER  0.61 
(0.49) 
BEECHNUT  0.26 
(0.44) 
EARTHS-BEST  0.04 
(0.20) 
HEINZ  0.09 
(0.28) 
ORG-BABY  0.004 
(0.06) 
MULTI  0.08 
(0.27) 
STORE  CHARACTERISTICS: 
GROCERY  0.83 
(0.38) 
UPSCALE  0.03 
(0.16) 
ETHNIC  0.03 
(0.17) 
DISCOUNT  0.05 
(0.21) 
SMALL-GROC  0.02 
(0.15) 
CONVENIENCE  0.01 
(0.12) 
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Table 3. Continued 
Variable 
San  Jose  Raleigh 
All Data  Grocery  Other Stores  Grocery  Other Stores 
STORE  CHARACTERISTICS  (cont'd.): 
OTHERSTORE  0.04  da  0.19  da  0.31 
(0.25)  (0.39)  (0.47) 
SQFT  1.16  1.09  1.04  1.20  1.53 
(0.93)  (0.81)  (0.98)  (0.88)  (1.61) 
WEIGH  0.55  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
(0.50) 
No. of Observations  1,689  563  196  83  1  99 
"The number of observations, n, is displayed for select variables in brackets. 
square feet, and location where the observation is collected. A linear model is estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) as follows: 
where PRICEjk,  is the price per ounce of the  jth jar in city k (i.e., San  Jose or Raleigh) 
in store type I (i.e., grocery stores or all other types), BRAND, indicates the mth brand 
of babyfood (e.g., Gerber, Beechnut, etc.), STORE, indicates the nth store type within 
all other stores (e.g., upscale market, convenience store, etc.), and vjk,  is  the  random error 
component.13  All other variables are as defined in table 2. In  this model, the  dependent 
variable is the price per ounce of the observation. The price per ounce, as opposed to 
price per jar, is used as the dependent variable because jars vary in size according to 
stage. 
The estimation process began with the pooling of the data across cities, venues, and 
the stage of the babyfood. However, concerns that heterogeneity in these subsamples 
might preclude such pooling caused us to consider various subsamples separately. For 
example, unobserved differences between San Jose and Raleigh or changes in prefer- 
ences for babyfood as  the  baby ages may result in different coefficient estimates by city 
and stage, respectively. Therefore, the location where the data were collected (i.e., 
Raleigh and San  Jose),  the  venue in which the  babyfood was sold (i.e., grocery stores and 
non-grocery stores), and the stage of the babyfood (i.e., stage 1, stage 2, and stage 3) 
were considered separately. Non-grocery stores consist of upscale markets, ethnic 
markets (in San  Jose only),  discount stores (e.g., Target,  Wal-Mart), small grocery stores 
(in San Jose only), and convenience stores (e.g., 7-11). 
l3  A log-linear model was also estimated. It is difIicult to compare the linear and log-linear models directly because of the 
differences  in the dependentvariable. Greene (1993, p. 154) provides an  analog  to  the R2  measure that can be used to compare 
the two models. The analogR2  was calculated as  follows: RZ  = 1 - (~ez/~(y~  -g)'), where ei  denotes the error terms, y, is the 
dependent variable, and g is the mean of  the dependent variable. The log-linear model performs slightly better in the San 
Jose models; however, the simcance  of the results does not differ between the two models. The linear results were selected 
for presentation here. 142  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 4. Results of Tests for Pooling the Data 
Test  Degrees of  Critical 
Null Hypothesis  Statistic  Freedoma  Value  Result 
RALEIGH  = SAN  JOSE  7.24  15,  1,655  1.67  Reject Null 
GROCERY  =  NON-GROCERY  2.70  9,  1,661  1.88  Reject Null 
RALEIGH-GROCERY  =  RALEIGH~N-GROCERY  = 
SAN  JOSE-GROCERY  = SAN  JOSE~ON-GROCERY 6.96  34,  1,636  1.46  Reject Null 
 STAGE^ =   STAGE^ = STAGES  98.67  29,  1,641  1.46  Reject Null 
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the data for each subsample arise &om the same distribution (i.e., the coeffi- 
cients are the same in each subsample). An F-test is used to test the null hypothesis. The test is distributed as 
a ratio of chi-squares, with J degrees of heedom in the numerator and n-K degrees of heedom in the denominator, 
where J is the number of restrictions in the pooled model, n is the sample size, and K is the number of  free 
parameters in the unrestricted (i.e., disaggregated) models (Greene, 1993, p. 206). 
"The first value represents the numerator degrees of heedom in the F-test, and the second value represents the 
denominator degrees of &eedom. 
Table 5. Results of Tests for Heteroskedasticity 
Test  Degrees of  Critical 
Model  Statistic  Freedom  Value  Result 
RALEIGH  729.89  15  25.00  Reject Null 
SAN  JOSE  767.43  17  27.59  Reject Null 
GROCERY  1,035.77  10  18.31  Reject Null 
NON-GROCERY  350.80  16  26.30  Reject Null 
RALEIGH-GROCERY  713.11  10  18.31  Reject Null 
RALEIGH-NON-GROCERY  150.07  13  22.36  Reject Null 
SAN  JOSE-GROCERY  560.30  10  18.31  Reject Null 
SAN  JOSE~ON-GROCERY  234.67  16  26.30  Reject Null 
 STAGE^  411.53  15  25.00  Reject Null 
STAGE2  806.83  16  26.30  Reject Null 
STAGE3  171.27  14  23.69  Reject Null 
Notes: The null hypothesis in eachmodelis  homoskedasticity in the error term. ABreusch-Pagan Lagrange multi- 
plier test is used to test the null hypothesis. The test is distributed as chi-squared with K degrees of heedom, where 
K is the number of parameters in the model (Greene, 1993, p. 395). 
Table 4 shows the results of the  F-tests for pooling the data across these various sub- 
samples. The null hypothesis is that the data could be pooled across the particular 
subsample. For example, in the test according to city, the null hypothesis is that the 
Raleigh and San  Jose data arise from the same distribution. As shown in  table 4, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for each of the tests considered. Hence, the results are reported 
by location and venue, as  well as  by stage. The data are not robust enough to report 
further levels of disaggregation, such as location and venue by stage. 
In order to address any remaining heteroskedasticity, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test is used to test the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. As observed 
from table 5, the null hypothesis is  rejected for each of the models. Hence, all results are 
reported using Huber-White consistent standard errors. 
Table 6 reports the  results of four models according to the city and venue in which the 
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Table 6. Estimation Results Using Ordinary Least Squares 
(dependent variable = Price per Ounce) 
San  Jose  Raleigh 
Variable  Grocery  Other Stores  Grocery  Other Stores 
Intercept  0.133*** 
(0.003) 
ORGANIC  VARIABLE: 
ORGANIC  0.026*** 
(0.004) 
PF~ODUCT  CHARACTERISTICS: 
MEAT  0.078*** 
(0.008) 
LABEL  0.015*** 
(0.004) 
STAGE1  0.019*** 
(0.005) 
STAGE2  -0.003 
(0.003) 
GERBER  0.007** 
(0.003) 
HEINZ  -0.005 
(0.003) 
EARTHS-BEST  0.022*** 
(0.005) 
ORG-BABY  da 
MULTI  0.011*** 
(0.003) 
STORE  CHARACTERISTICS: 
UPSCLE  da 
ETHNIC  da 
DISCOUNT  da 
CONVENIENCE  da 
SQFT 
Adjusted R2  0.52 
No. of observations  563 
Notes: Single,  double, and triple asterisks (*)  denote statistical sigdicance  at  the lo%, 5%,  and 1% levels, respec- 
tively. Values in parentheses are Huber-White  consistent standard errors. 
values ranging from 0.52 to 0.91. Among the product characteristics, the price of  meat 
observations (i.e., jars with single meat ingredients, such as turkey or beef) is found to 
be consistently higher than other jars, ranging from 5q  to 10q per ounce. The price of 
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(the omitted category). Stage 2  jars are only priced significantly higher in non-grocery 
stores in San Jose and grocery stores in Raleigh, with a range of only 1@  to 2@  per ounce. 
In general, stage 1  jars are 2.5 ounces, stage 2  jars are 4  ounces, and stage 3  jars are 6 
ounces. Therefore, these results translate into prices which are 5@  to 18@  per jar higher 
for stage 1,  and 4@  to 8@  per jar higher for stage 2. Stage 3  foods are likely to have the 
most substitutes (i.e., table food). 
Other characteristics were also found to be significant factors in determining price. 
Relative to Beechnut (the omitted category), Gerber prices are consistently higher, 
ranging from 1@  to lo@  more than Beechnut. Heinz jars are priced fairly inconsistently 
across the samples. In San Jose non-grocery stores, Heinz jars are 2@  less per ounce, 
while in Raleigh non-grocery stores, Heinz jars are 8@  more per ounce. These results 
likely reflect regional differences in the products bought and sold. 
Jars sold in multi-packs are also priced differently depending on the venue and loca- 
tion. In San Jose, multi-pack jars sold in grocery stores are approximately l@  more per 
ounce than single jars, whereas multi-pack jars sold in grocery stores in Raleigh are 
almost 3@  less per ounce than single  jars. However, multi-pack jars sold in non-grocery 
stores in Raleigh were priced higher than single  jars. These results are contrary to the 
expectation that multi-pack  jars would be consistently priced lower than single jars to 
reflect volume discounts. 
To account for the venue in which the babyfood is sold, dummy variables are used for 
store type (e.g., ethnic grocery store, upscale grocery store, etc.) in the models focusing 
on stores other than standard grocery stores. Features of  the store types may result in 
variation in prices. For example, upscale grocery stores tend to have wider aisles, fewer 
items of  each product, and elaborate displays as compared to convenience stores. The 
"other" store type (representing uncategorized stores, such as drug stores and super- 
centers) is the omitted category. Results show prices are higher in small grocery stores 
and convenience markets, as  expected,  given that these venues tend to have fewer varie- 
ties, and likely do not enjoy economies of scale. Prices are also higher in upscale markets 
in Raleigh, reflecting the cost of  more elaborate displays and other luxury features of 
such venues. Prices are lower in ethnic markets in San Jose, where these types of  mar- 
kets tend to be large stores catering to a particular ethnic population, perhaps affording 
them the economies of  scale needed to offer more competitive prices. 
Turning to the variable of ultimate interest, ORGANIC, the price of organic babyfood 
is found to be significantly higher in all venues and locations, ranging from 2.6@ per 
ounce in San Jose grocery stores to 3.8@ per ounce in San Jose non-grocery stores. In 
Raleigh, the price is about 3@  per ounce higher in both types of  stores. These values 
translate into a lo@  to 15@  per jar price differential between organic and conventional 
babyfood, assuming an average jar size of  4 ounces (the size of  stage 2 jars). 
Because of  possible differences in consumer preferences according to the age of  the 
baby, the model was also estimated by stage of  babyfood. Again, as reported in table 4, 
the test for pooling shows data on the stages of  babyfood are not drawn from the same 
distribution. Tests for heteroskedasticity were also conducted, with the results reported 
in table 5.  Table 5  shows the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity can be rejected in each 
model. Hence, the results are reported by stage and corrected for heteroskedasticity 
using a Huber-White consistent variance-covariance matrix. 
Table 7 reports the estimation results by stage. In the stage 1  model, the organic 
premium is not significant. It could be the case that at the age when babies are Maguire, Owens, and Simon  The Price Premium  for Organic Babyfood  145 
Table 7. Estimation Results by Stage Using Ordinary Least Squares 
(dependent variable = Price  per Ounce) 
MODEL 
Variable  Stage 1 
Intercept 
ORGANIC  Vmm 
ORGANIC 
























No. of observations 
Notes: Single,  double, and triple asterisks (*)  denote statistical significance at  the lo%, 5%,  and 1%  levels, respec- 
tively. Values in parentheses are Huber-White consistent standard errors. 
consuming stage 1  foods there are a number of substitutes, including breast milk, 
formula, and cereals-none  of which are represented in this model. The availability of 
these substitute goods may result in a negligible organic premium, if any, for stage 1 
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The organic premium for stages  2 and 3 is 3q and 10q per ounce, respectively. During 
stage 2, babyfood is  likely to comprise a larger proportion of the baby's diet than in stage 
1.  While the  stage 2 baby's diet may be supplemented by formula and/or breast milk, the 
child will consume an  increasing amount of babyfood. The lack of substitutes may make 
demand for stage 2 babyfoods more inelastic, thereby driving the  premium higher. This 
argument, however, does not extend easily to stage 3, where a multitude of substitute 
foods existincluding  most table foods. 
Finally, because Gerber is the only brand available in both conventional and organic 
varieties, the model was estimated using only Gerber observations (not reported here). 
The estimated premium using the Gerber observations is similar. The premium for 
Gerber organic babyfood (i.e., the Tender Harvest label) is 3G  per ounce. This is  not 
necessarily surprising,  given that Gerber organic observations represent 79%  of the total 
organic observations. While it  is  not clear if Gerber can drive price above marginal cost, 
it does seem reasonable to assume the company has significant market power. Gerber 
is sold in over 90% of  supermarkets in the United States, and very often Heinz and 
Beechnut pay slotting  fees to obtain desired shelf space while Gerber does not pay such 
fees (U.S. Court ofAppeals, 2001). Nevertheless, the  fact that the  magnitude of the  price 
premium is similar to the premium in the other models provides some comfort. 
As discussed earlier, this premium represents both individual willingness to pay for 
the organic characteristic, as  well as the higher marginal production costs which may 
be associated with organic babyfood. Organic babyfood is likely more costly to produce 
than conventional babyfood; however, assuming the hedonic framework applies, this 
premium represents willingness to pay for a characteristic, regardless of the additional 
production costs. If individuals value organic babyfood at  less than the market price, 
then one would likely see changes in the market, such as producers exiting and fewer 
lines of organic babyfood available for sale. In  fact, just the opposite has occurred. The 
number of  producers of  organic babyfood has increased over the last few years, and 
large, well-known producers, such as Gerber, have joined the ranks of smaller, lesser 
known companies in offering this product. Although the data  offer only a snapshot of the 
babyfood market, it seems appropriate to interpret the premium as  the value the indi- 
vidual is willing to pay for the characteristic. 
Of interest is  how this organic premium compares to results found in other research. 
As noted earlier, one study (Harris, 1997) cites a premium of 21q per jar for organic 
babyfood in 1993. This result is based on national scanner data from grocery stores, 
exclusively. The study did not control for brand of babyfood, but rather aggregated the 
brand and organic variables. The differences in results between this study and the 
Harris study are  not surprising. Ten years ago there was less competition in the organic 
babyfood market, costs of  production may have been higher in the early 1990s, and 
brand loyalty may have been more prominent in  the Harris results.14  Earth's Best itself 
acknowledges its babyfood costs approximately 50% more than conventional babyfood 
(Earth's Best, 2002). Applying this figure to the price data used here suggests organic 
babyfood would be almost 28q more per jar than conventional babyfood, as opposed to 
10q to 15q more per jar found in this study. It  is  unclear how Earth's Best arrived at  this 
value. If in  fact the Earth's Best analysis is based on older data, then these differences 
are not surprising. 
14 These assertions were cowed  by personal conversation with Harris on July 14,2003. Maguire, Owens, and Simon  The Price Premium for  Organic Babyfood  147 
Thompson and Glaser (2001)  analyzed scanner data  from 1988  to 1999,  finding a clear 
downward trend in the price premium associated with four types of babyfood--dinners, 
fruits, vegetables, and juices. For example, the price premium associated with dinners 
in 1988, the first year of  their analysis, was 123%. This premium decreased rather 
steadily to 51% in 1999. Their results for the other three types of babyfood are similar. 
The findings from our study indicate the price of organic babyfood is 16%  to 27% more 
than its conventional counterparts, all else equal, and may signal a continued decrease 
in the premium associated with organic babyfood. 
Conclusion 
This study combines a unique data set with the  hedonic framework to estimate how 
consumers (specifically, parents of babies) value reductions in pesticide exposure, as 
evidenced through the organic babyfood market. Results indicate individuals are  willing 
to pay 3$ to 4$ per ounce more, or lo$  to 15$ per jar (approximately 16-27%) for organic 
babyfood as  opposed to conventional varieties. These results provide interesting insights 
into the  prices consumers are  paying for organic babyfood. Even though babyfood is only 
purchased for a short period of time in a child's life (typically ages 3-12  months), some 
consumers pay a premium to feed their baby organic rather than conventional babyfood. 
While this information is interesting in its own right, it could be combined with 
information, once available, on the perceived cancer risk reduction conferred by organic 
babyfood and consumption data to estimate a value of  reduced lifetime cancer risks 
associated with childhood dietary exposures, a subject of future research. Such infor- 
mation could be gleaned from interviews with parents regarding risk perceptions and 
feeding patterns. 
Economists use information on health and safety products to infer values of risk 
reductions. The majority of the risk-reduction studies apply to adult populations (e.g., 
seat belts) or households (e.g., smoke detectors). Two studies have investigated safety 
products used exclusively  by children. Carlin and Sandy (1991)  examined mothers' pur- 
chase and  use of car seats,  and  Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins (2001)  examined child (and 
adult) bicycle helmets use. Because babyfood is targeted to a very specific age group, 
examining this market presents a unique opportunity to further estimate  parental will- 
ingness to pay to reduce risks to their children-specifically,  willingness to pay to reduce 
dietary pesticide exposures in infants. 
It is  important to note that the premium for organic babyfood may not only reflect the 
value associated with reducing dietary exposure to pesticide residues as  suggested here. 
While reduced pesticide residues is likely the  primary reason behind organic purchases, 
it could be the case that individuals value organic babyfood for other reasons as well. 
For example, individuals may purchase organic foods because of a preference for environ- 
mentally friendly farming practices or a concern for farm worker exposure to pesticides. 
Using retail data, these competing effects cannot be distinguished, nor can value be 
apportioned to them. Instead, one can merely assert that the premium reflects a desire 
to avoid pesticide residues. 
Even if we assume  negligible competing effects,  the  organic premium provides limited 
information regarding willingness to pay for reduced dietary  exposures to pesticide 
residues. Specifically, it provides a lower-bound estimate for purchasers of organic 
babyfood. By construction, the organic premium estimated here does not account for 148  April2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
values for reduced exposures held by non-purchasers. Simply because non-purchasers 
do not buy organic babyfood does not mean they have no value for the reduced dietary 
exposure. Rather, this choice may suggest either that their values are lower than the 
price premium or they are pursuing other means (e.g., making their own babyfoods using 
organic produce), perhaps at  a greater price than the premium, to reduce exposure. 
Likewise, without information on these other means of reducing dietary exposure, the 
premium clearly cannot be interpreted as their maximum willingness to pay. Instead, 
it  can only be asserted that the organic premium represents a lower-bound value for this 
group. 
[Received  March 2003;Jinal revision received October 2003.1 
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